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When television crews set up their cameras at apresidential nominating convention and net­work anchors gather in their booths, it is only 
a matter of time before someone alludes to William 
Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech at the 1896 Demo­
cratic convention as the leading example of an orator's abil­
ity to sway listeners. In 1953, a poll of 277 professors of 
American history or government ranked Bryan's "Cross 
of Gold" speech among the fifty most significant docu­
ments in American history. A century after Bryan deliv­
ered the speech, his words still have power, and some of 
his metaphors have passed into the common idiom.
Born in Salem, Illinois, in 1860, Bryan grew up in a 
devoutly religious household. His mother, Mariah, came 
from the locally prominent Jennings family and was ac­
tive in the Methodist Church. His father, Silas Bryan, a law­
yer and judge of the circuit court, was a prayerful Baptist 
and a committed advocate of the Democratic party. Bryan, 
at the age of fourteen, joined the Cumberland Presbyte­
rian Church, then moved to a mainstream Presbyterian de­
nomination upon leaving Salem. He disappointed his fa­
ther in his choice of church, but no such apostasy marked 
his choice of political parties—he was a Democrat all his 
life. After graduating from Illinois College and Union Law 
School and marrying his college sweetheart Mary Baird, 
Bryan practiced law briefly in Jacksonville, Illinois, then 
moved his law practice and his family to Lincoln, Ne­
braska, in 1887.
In Nebraska, Bryan plunged into Democratic party
politics and won election to the House of Representatives 
in 1890. Democrats had rarely won elections in Nebraska 
over the previous quarter century, but Bryan was aided 
by two unusual circumstances. First, a new party emerged, 
soon to be called the Populists, attacking the older parties 
and demanding governmental action to assist hard-pressed 
farmers and urban workers. In Bryan's congressional dis­
trict, the new party drew a number of votes that might 
otherwise have gone to the Republican candidate. Second, 
Nebraskans voted on a referendum to prohibit alcohol, 
actuating an all-out campaign by the opponents of Prohi­
bition, especially in the "wringing-wet" metropolis of 
Omaha, then part of Bryan's district. Personally a tee­
totaler, Bryan nonetheless endorsed his party's strong op­
position to Prohibition, and he benefited from the 
antiprohibitionists' work to mobilize wet voters.
Leaving their three children in the care of Mary's par­
ents, the Bryans formed a strong team on Capitol Hill. Mary 
followed public issues closely, and the Washington Post 
commented that "her judgment is excellent." The two of 
them always worked closely together—she had been ad­
mitted to the Nebraska bar in 1888 to assist with his law 
practice and at home they had a desk designed so that one 
of them could sit on either side to facilitate their coopera­
tive endeavors. With Bryan a congressman, they now 
worked together on his speeches. When Bryan rose to 
speak on the floor of the House, Mary sat in the visitors 
gallery, coaching him by nodding her head or signaling 
disapproval.
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Though Bryan's winning campaign in 1890 concen­
trated on tariff issues, he also endorsed "free coinage of 
silver on equal terms with gold." That issue soon loomed 
larger in the nation's politics. By 1892, when he sought 
reelection, Bryan had emerged as a prominent spokesman 
for what had become known simply as "silver."
"Silver" was, in fact, an argument for a federal cur­
rency policy that would counteract the long-term defla­
tionary tendencies of the post-Civil War era. From 1865
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onward, most prices had fallen, due partly to more effi­
cient production in agriculture and manufacturing, partly 
to a persistent federal surplus, and partly to the failure of 
the money supply to grow as rapidly as the population. 
Some who focused on the last of these argued that the gov­
ernment could stabilize prices by issuing more currency— 
they reasoned that inflation came about when the currency 
supply grew more rapidly than the economy, and, con­
versely, that deflation occurred when the currency supply 
failed to grow as rapidly as the economy. What was needed, 
they concluded, was a currency that grew in proportion to 
the population.
From the 1870s onward, those who called for the fed­
eral government to expand the currency found their most 
receptive audience among farmers in debt. After the Civil 
War, farmers in the western Midwest and the South had 
greatly increased their harvests of corn, wheat, and cot­
ton. As production rose, prices fell. Farmers had accom­
plished much of their expansion on borrowed money and 
their high level of indebtedness increased their dependence 
on cash crops to make their mortgage payments.
Falling crop prices magnified a farmer's debt. For ex­
ample, a farmer in 1881 who borrowed $1,000 expected to 
pay interest each year and to repay the full amount at the 
end of five years. (Loans then were not amortized.) Corn 
sold for 63 cents per bushel, at best, in 1881, so the $1,000 
loan was equivalent to 1,587 bushels of corn; in 1886, when 
the loan came due, corn sold for 36 cents per bushel, so 
$1,000 required 2,777 bushels. Ten percent interest would 
have cost $100 per year—159 bushels of corn in 1881 but 
312 in 1885. Thus, falling prices pushed farmers to raise 
more and more each year, and the more they raised, the 
lower prices fell. Like the character in Alice in Wonderland, 
they had to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place.
Such debtor farmers quickly understood and readily 
embraced the promise of an expanded money supply that 
would stabilize prices. As Bryan put it in 1893, those who 
opposed currency expansion wanted to make "a man pay 
a debt with a dollar larger than the one he borrowed. . . . 
They loaned money, and now they want more than they 
loaned." He also presented the issue in regional terms. "We 
simply say to the East [the nation's financial center]," he 
told a Kansas City crowd in 1891, "take your hands out of
our pockets and keep them out." In 1894, he wrote a plat­
form for Nebraska Democrats that argued that the gov­
ernment should "make the dollar so stable in its purchas­
ing power that it will defraud neither debtor nor creditor."
From the 1870s onward, the advocates of inflation had 
looked to two sources for additional circulating currency— 
"greenbacks" (the paper money first issued during the 
Civil War) and silver dollars. Throughout the late 1870s 
and the 1880s, a minor political party known as the 
Greenbackers had advocated more paper money but failed 
to gain a significant following, due partly to distrust of 
paper money that could not be redeemed in a precious 
metal. In 1873, Congress specified that the Mint could coin 
only gold into dollars, thereby putting the United States 
on a de facto gold standard, something many bankers and 
some Treasury officials agreed was necessary for full 
American participation in the international economy and 
necessary, specifically, to encourage continued foreign in­
vestment. In response to agitation over the currency issue, 
however, Congress provided for limited coinage of silver 
dollars after 1877. But prices continued to fall and infla­
tionists argued that unlimited silver coinage had the po­
tential to counteract the deflation. In the 1892 presidential 
election, the Populist party attracted one voter out of 
twelve with a platform of far-reaching reforms, including 
currency expansion.
Three elements stand out in the Populists' analysis of 
the political economy. The first element dated at least to 
Andrew Jackson, as Populist campaigners again and again 
proclaimed their opposition to concentrations of economic 
power. Jay Burrows, a Nebraska Populist, wrote that cor­
porations had made "the toiling millions" into "the tools 
of a few plutocrats." For the Populists, concentrations of 
economic power—railroads and grain markets were the 
most obvious to Nebraska farmers—posed dangers to eco­
nomic opportunity for the individual as well as to politi­
cal liberty. To control monopoly, the second element in their 
program, Populists called for more governmental involve­
ment in the economy, specifically, for federal ownership 
of the railroads and of the telegraph and telephone sys­
tems and for government alternatives to savings banks. 
"We believe the time has come," they proclaimed in their 
1892 platform, "when the railroad companies will either 
own the people or the people must own the railroads." 
Their 1892 platform also demanded inflation—through 
either greenbacks, silver, or both—and a graduated income 
tax to replace the tariff. Populists argued—the third ele­
ment in their analysis—that the people had to bring gov­
ernment itself more closely under their control, and they 
proposed a range of reforms including the secret ballot, 
the direct election of United States senators, and direct elec­
tion of the president and vice-president.
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Reelected in 1892, Bryan rapidly emerged as silver's 
most eloquent defender in Congress the following year 
when President Grover Cleveland asked Congress to end 
all silver coinage. Active in Nebraska state politics, he iden­
tified silver both as the issue which most distinguished 
his faction of the state Democratic party from the conser­
vatives who controlled the state party organization, and 
as the most promising common ground with the state's 
Populists, whom he had viewed as potential allies from 
the beginning. In 1893, he worked hard to persuade the 
Democrats in the Nebraska legislature to help elect a Populist 
to the U.S. Senate. In 1894, Bryan convinced Nebraska 
Democrats to endorse the Populist candidate for governor 
as the best way to defeat the Republican candidate, who 
was known to be anti-Catholic. Both times, the Populists won.
Having twice swung Democratic support behind 
Populist candidates, Bryan hoped that a similar fusion 
might elect him to the Senate in 1895, but those hopes foun­
dered on a Republican majority in the state legislature. 
Bryan then joined the Omaha World-Herald (the state's lead­
ing Democratic newspaper) as an editorialist and reporter, 
and he traveled the nation speaking on the silver issue. 
He also celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday, making him 
constitutionally eligible to seek the presidency.
Early in 1896, Bryan wrote to prominent Populists urging all silver advocates to unite for the upcom­ing presidential campaign. He also suggested that 
the Populists schedule their national nominating conven­
tion following those of the Republicans and Democrats; 
that way, if both major parties rejected silver, the Populists 
could rally all silverites, including Democrats and Repub­
licans, behind their banner. Bryan probably cherished an­
other scenario as well—if the Democrats were to nominate 
a silver advocate, it would be essential that the Populists 
not already have a separate ticket in the field. Nearly two 
months earlier, Bryan had confided to a close political ally 
that he considered his own nomination possible if silver 
Democrats controlled their party's convention.
Throughout the first half of 1896, Bryan traveled the 
country making speeches and working toward two goals: 
first, silver delegates must comprise the majority of the 
Democratic convention; second, they must remain uncom­
mitted to any of the leading candidates. By advocating that 
states send delegates committed to silver but not commit­
ted to specific candidates, Bryan knew that he was mak­
ing it difficult, perhaps impossible, for any candidate to 
come to the convention with the two-thirds majority nec­
essary to take the nomination. At the same time, his mail 
brought offers of support from across the South and 
West. When all the delegates had been chosen, silver 
claimed the majority, and most of the silver delegates found
a complete set of Bryan's speeches in their mailboxes.
While Bryan bent all his efforts toward keeping the 
Democratic convention open, William McKinley was 
tightly locking up the Republican nomination. Bryan at­
tended the GOP convention, in St. Louis, as a reporter for 
the World-Herald. Author of the highly protectionist tariff 
of 1890, McKinley blamed the Democrats for the depressed 
economic conditions since 1893 and presented the protec­
tive tariff as the cure. He avoided the money question un­
til shortly before the convention, then agreed to a platform 
commitment to "the existing gold standard." When the 
convention adopted that gold plank, a group of silver sup­
porters left the convention hall and their party. Their ac­
tion delighted Bryan, for it pointed to the fulfillment of 
his hope for unity of all silver supporters.
In Chicago, the Democrats' platform committee, domi­
nated by silverites, drafted a report at odds with the policies 
of President Grover Cleveland, a conservative Democrat; 
a minority of the committee favored a platform that op­
posed silver and applauded Cleveland. To defend the 
majority report before the convention, the committee chair­
man designated Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina and 
Bryan.
The convention took up the platform before it turned 
to nominating candidates. Tillman wanted to close the 
debate, but Bryan persuaded him to lead off instead. Bryan 
later recorded that "I was more effective in a brief speech 
in conclusion than in a long speech that simply laid down 
propositions for another to answer." Bryan sat with the 
Nebraska delegation on the floor of the convention, suck­
ing a lemon to clear his throat, while the early speakers 
droned on. Tillman harangued for nearly an hour, then 
came three conservatives advocating the minority report. 
Only the first of them aroused much enthusiasm and, when 
the last finished, Bryan sprang from his seat and bounded 
to the platform. He raised his right arm and bade the crowd 
be quiet. A wave of anticipation swept the hall as the sil­
ver delegates eagerly waited for Bryan to put their emo­
tions into words. He did not fail them.
He began with a modest disclaimer of his own ora­
torical abilities as compared to those who had preceded 
him, a technique he used to emphasize issues rather than 
personalities. As he developed his major points, Bryan later 
recalled, "the audience seemed to rise and sit down as one 
man. At the close of a sentence it would rise and shout, 
and when I began upon another sentence, the room was 
as still as church."
He defended the full range of reforms in the platform, 
giving special attention to the income tax, which he had 
also championed in Congress. The money issue, he in­
sisted, was but the starting point for economic reform. In 
advocating that his party stand with the people rather than
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*"the idle holders of idle capital," he presented a metaphor 
that his party was to employ again and again through the 
twentieth century. "There are two ideas of government. 
There are those who believe that, if you will only legislate 
to make the well-to-do prosperous, their prosperity will 
leak through on those below. The Democratic idea, how­
ever, has been that if you legislate to make the masses 
prosperous, their prosperity will find its way up through 
every class which rests upon them."
Bryan's conclusion was the dramatic high point. "Hav­
ing behind us the producing masses of this nation and the 
world, supported by the commercial interests, the labor­
ing interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer 
their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You 
shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of 
thorns." Bryan raked his fingers down his temples. "You 
shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." He 
stretched his arms straight out from his sides as if on a 
cross and stood silent for a moment, then dropped his arms 
and took a step back.
The delegates sat in stunned silence as Bryan began to 
return to the floor, then the demonstration came, shaking 
the hall for a half hour. Delegates carried Bryan around 
the hall on their shoulders, and others came to him to shout 
their support for the nomination. Bryan's "Cross of Gold" 
speech achieved instant immortality.
The speech accomplished its effect as much by the occasion and the style as by the content. The anx­ious silver delegates knew they had the majority but many were only weakly committed to a candidate. 
Bryan later described the need of the moment as "to put 
into words the sentiments of a majority of the delegates." 
He proved ideal for the task. His voice, a carefully culti­
vated and powerful instrument, could reach into every part 
of the great convention hall, an important ability in a day 
before electronic amplification. Many of his most striking 
phrases had been tested, revised, and retested in earlier 
speeches. He had spent his time during the train trip to 
Chicago organizing his thoughts in expectation of an op­
portunity to speak. Anticipating his opponents' arguments, 
he made final plans the night before, summoning his best 
metaphors from hundreds of rehearsals. On the conven­
tion floor, he stood forth as what he called "the voice of a 
triumphant majority." The speech transformed Bryan from 
a presumptuous youngster in the rear ranks of the periph­
eral candidates into a top contender for the nomination. 
Since then, his performance has been the standard example 
of the ability of an orator to sway a convention.
Bryan realized his hope for uniting the silver forces 
when the Populists and Silver Republicans made him their 
nominee. The marvelous speaking voice that gave him the
nomination became his major campaign instrument, as he 
traveled eighteen thousand miles by train, visited 
twenty-six states and more than two hundred and fifty cit­
ies and towns, and spoke to as many as five million people. 
Mary was usually by his side.
When the voters had their say in November, Bryan 
got almost six and one-half million votes, more than any 
previous candidate, and he carried twenty-two of the 
forty-five states. McKinley, however, received more than 
seven million votes, and the twenty-three states that he 
carried gave him a large majority in the electoral college. 
Republicans had usually enjoyed electoral college majori­
ties from 1860 onward, but McKinley's victory marked the 
first time in twenty-four years that a Republican received 
a popular majority. For more than twenty years, national 
politics had been stalemated as neither party commanded 
a working majority, but McKinley's victory initiated a third 
of a century of Republican dominance in national politics. 
Bryan lost the presidency twice more, in 1900 and 1908, 
but he remained the most significant leader of the Demo­
cratic party until the nomination of Woodrow Wilson in 
1912, a period of party leadership almost unmatched in 
American political history.
As a political leader, Bryan had a sincere and unshak­
able confidence in the ability of the people to govern them­
selves, and his confidence in the people was reciprocated 
in the form of a popular following with few parallels in 
American politics. This large following gave Bryan a sig­
nificant role in the passage of such reforms as the income 
tax, direct election of senators, prohibition, and woman 
suffrage. Under Bryan's leadership, the Democratic party 
jettisoned most of the commitment to minimal government 
that had been the party's most prominent characteristic 
from Andrew Jackson to Grover Cleveland. Instead, Bryan 
and his allies fused Jacksonian antimonopolism to a com­
mitment to governmental intervention on behalf of "the 
people" and against powerful economic interests. "A pri­
vate monopoly," he never tired of repeating, "is indefen­
sible and intolerable." As Bryan argued passionately for 
the use of an activist state to defend ordinary citizens from 
the monopolies and trusts of his day, he laid the basis for 
the activist twentieth-century Democratic party—the party 
of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon 
Johnson. ♦>
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